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For the past several years the problem of drunk driving has be-
come of increasingly intense public concern. In response to this con-
cern, the Kansas Legislature has passed major amendments to the 
drunk driving laws.1 The most recent amendments2 passed the legis-
lature in 1985 in conjunction with changes in state liquor laws.3 
The 1985 amendments offer a consolidated package that toughens 
criminal penalties and limits the opportunity for certain defendants 
to receive diversion.4 At the same time, the new laws expand the 
power of the police to act against persons suspected of drunk driv-
ing.5 These expanded powers affect both the circumstances under 
which the police can order suspects to undergo tests and the kinds 
of tests that can be ordered. This Article examines the changes in 
police procedure required by the new drunk driving laws. The Arti-
cle first provides a general description of the recent changes and 
then analyzes some of the constitutional and practical problems 
those changes raise. 
A. Summary of the New Laws 
The new drunk driving laws present several major revisions in 
police procedure. These revisions center on the statutory doctrine of 
implied consent. Under this doctrine, a person suspected of drunk 
driving is deemed to have consented to chemical testing for blood 
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1 See Act of April 13, 1984, ch. 37, 1984 Kan. Sess. Laws 313 (codified as amended at 
K.S.A. §§ 8-254, 8-288, 8-1567); Act of April 21, 1983, ch. 37, 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws 285 
(codified as amended at K.S.A. §§ 8-255, 8-285, 8-1001, 8-1005, 8-1567, 22-2908). 
1 See Act of May 9, 1985, ch. 50, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 340; Act of April 27, 1985, ch. 
48, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 306. 
8 See Hearing on S.B. 126-129 Before Senate Committee on Federal and State Affairs, 
1985 Sess. (Feb. 1, 1985); Hearings Before House Committee on Federal and State Af-
fairs, 1985 Sess. (Feb. 26-28, 1985). 
4 See Act of April 27, 1985, ch. 48, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 306, Sec. 9, 11-12, 17 
(codified as amended at K.S.A. §§ 8-1567, 12-4415, 12-4416, 22-2909). 
8 See Act of May 9, 1985, ch. 50, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 340 (codified as amended at 
§§ 8-1001, 8-1002, 8-1004, 8-1006 (Supp. 1985)). 
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alcohol content in exchange for exercising the privilege of driving.6 
Although that consent may be withdrawn, the penalty for doing so 
is suspension of the person's driver's license. The purpose of this 
scheme is to induce as many drivers as possible to submit to testing7 
and to relieve officers from the necessity of forcibly testing drivers 
who refuse consent. 
One major change under the new laws is that consent is now im-
plied even when a person suspected of drunk driving is not arrested. 
Under the old statute, consent to blood or breath tests was implied 
only if an officer arrested or otherwise took a suspect into custody.8 
Under the new statute, however, a motorist gives implied consent 
when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
was operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
and the person either is arrested or has been involved in a motor 
vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal 
injury or death.9 This change eliminates the need for an actual ar-
rest before requiring chemical tests, as long as probable cause10 to 
arrest exists and an accident has occurred. Thus, police may now 
demand a test from an injured suspect who is being treated at a 
hospital but who has not yet been arrested. 
A second significant change is the expansion of the types of tests 
permitted under implied consent. Prior to the 1985 amendments, 
consent was implied only for tests to determine blood alcohol con-
tent.11 The new law permits tests to determine the "presence of al-
6 K.S.A. § 8-1001(a) (Supp. 1985). 
7 See Comment, The New Kansas Drunk Driving Law: A Closer Look, 31 KAN. L. 
REV. 409, 410 (1983). 
8 K.S.A. § 8-1001(b) (1982) (repealed 1985). 
9 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (b) (Supp. 1985). 
10 We recognize that the precise words of the statute require "reasonable grounds" to 
believe that an offense has occurred rather than "probable cause." However, the two terms 
have consistently been read as synonymous. Thus, in State v. Giddings, 216 Kan. 14, 531 
P.2d 445 (1975), (syllabus of the court, H 4) the court described K.S.A. § 22-2401(c), 
which requires probable cause to arrest, as permitting arrest when the officer "reasonably 
believes" the party has committed a felony. Similarly, in United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 418 (1975) the court described the common law rule permitting an officer to 
make a warrantless felony arrest as synonymous with a requirement of probable cause. Id. 
at 421. See also W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5, at 141 ("At 
common law, a peace officer was authorized to arrest a person for a felony without first 
obtaining an arrest warrant whenever he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that a felony 
had been committed and that the person to be arrested had committed it (i.e., what now 
constitutes Fourth Amendment probable cause)" (emphasis supplied)). 
While there is little doubt that the legislature has produced a statute requiring probable 
cause, it is equally clear that they have done so in a confusing manner. The archaic term 
"reasonable grounds" is not nearly as well-known to lawyers or police as is "probable 
cause." Indeed the term "reasonable grounds" virtually invites confusion because of its 
semantic similarity with the lesser standard of "reasonable suspicion" required for a "stop 
and frisk." See K.S.A. § 22-2402. Accordingly, we urge the legislature to amend the stat-
ute to substitute the term "probable cause" in place of "reasonable grounds." 
Finally, if for some reason we are incorrect in our analysis, and the legislature has 
intended to permit blood tests or some standard less than probable cause, the statute is 
clearly unconstitutional. There is no constitutional authority permitting the government to 
engage in a bodily intrusion such as a blood test on less than probable cause. See Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
11 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (a) (1982) (repealed 1985). 
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cohol or drugs."12 These tests can now include not only blood and 
breath tests but also tests of "urine or other bodily substance."13 
The statute contemplates that a police officer will first attempt to 
measure intoxication by requesting a breath or blood test. If an of-
ficer believes, however, that a driver is impaired by a drug not sub-
ject to detection by the blood or breath test, the officer may request 
a urine test.14 The collection of the urine sample must be supervised 
by persons of the same sex as the person tested and must be con-
ducted in a private setting.15 Under the language of the new stat-
ute, tests of other bodily fluids, such as saliva, would also be 
permitted. 
A third change to the implied consent statute has no counterpart 
in the old statute. The new statute requires that a series of warn-
ings be given to a drunk driving suspect when tests are requested. 
The suspect is to be advised, both orally and in writing, that: (1) 
there is no right to consult with an attorney regarding whether to 
submit to testing; (2) refusal to test will result in a six-month 
driver's license suspension; (3) such refusal may be used against 
him in any trial on a charge of driving under the influence; (4) if he 
decides to test, the results of the tests may be used in evidence; and 
(5) after completing the tests, he has a right to consult with an 
attorney and may secure additional testing on his own.16 
A fourth major change is that the statute now explicitly states 
that police are not required to preserve samples of blood, breath or 
urine for purposes of independent testing by defendants.17 Yet the 
new law allows, as did the prior law, a defendant to challenge the 
police test. It gives a person who has consented to testing a reasona-
ble opportunity to have additional tests conducted by a physician of 
his own choice. If the police refuse to permit such additional test-
ing, the results of the police testing cannot be admitted into 
evidence.18 
In addition to these changes in police procedure, the new law pro-
vides for more severe treatment of drunk driving defendants. A 
mandatory ninety-day jail sentence is imposed upon a person con-
victed of driving under the influence if the violation was committed 
during the time the person's driver's license was suspended or re-
voked as the result of a previous conviction for driving under the 
influence.19 The statute limits the possibility of diversion for certain 
defendants. If a defendant charged with DUI had a blood alcohol 
content of .20 percent or more or was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident resulting in personal injury or death, the new law does not 
12 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (a) (Supp. 1985). 
18 Id. 
14 Id. § 8-1001 (d). 
16 Id. A suspect may, however, waive this right to privacy. 
16 Id. § 8-1001 (f). 
17 Id. § 8-1006. 
18 Id. § 8-1004. 
19 Id. § 8-262(4). 
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permit the defendant to enter a diversion agreement.20 When diver-
sion is otherwise permissible, a prosecuting attorney has the express 
authority to require license suspension or revocation as part of the 
diversion agreement.21 
In addition to toughening penalties, the new law broadens the 
kinds of conduct that may be punished. Whereas the old statute did 
not directly address such conduct, the new statute extends the 
crime of driving under the influence to include attempted operation 
of a vehicle.22 The new statute also criminalizes the act of driving 
with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .10 percent or more.23 Prior 
to the 1985 amendments, driving with such a BAC was mere prima 
facie evidence that a defendant was incapable of safely driving. 
Now, driving with a .10 percent or greater BAC is per se 
criminal.24 
The law also modifies the driver's license suspension procedure 
used when a person refuses to take a requested test. Upon refusal, 
the officer administering the testing immediately notifies the person 
of the suspension. The officer then confiscates the person's driver's 
license and issues a fifteen-day temporary permit. The driver may 
request an administrative hearing from the division of vehicles. The 
scope of the hearing is limited to whether (a) reasonable grounds 
existed for requiring the test; (b) notice was given; (c) the test was 
refused; and (d) the person was arrested or involved in a motor ve-
hicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal 
injury or death.25 The minimum length of suspension is six months. 
B. Analysis of the New Statute 
1. Testing the Unarrested Suspect 
The first significant change in the Kansas drunk driving law is 
the expansion of the implied consent doctrine to permit testing even 
when police have declined to arrest. Before this change the police 
could presume implied consent and request a blood test only if a 
driver was arrested or otherwise taken into custody for driving 
under the influence.26 Pursuant to the 1985 amendment, consent is 
also implied when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe the 
person was attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the 
influence and was involved in an accident resulting in property 
20 Id. § 22-2909(e); see also § 12-3315(b)(3)-(4) (municipal court diversion agree-
ments). 
21 Id. § 22-2909(e). 
22 Id. § 8-1567(a). 
28 Id. 
2i Id. § 8-1567(a)(1). 
25 Id. § 8-1002. 
26 K.S.A. § 8-1001(a) (1982) (repealed 1985). 
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damage, personal injury or death.27 Thus, officers can now demand 
a sample from an injured suspect being treated at a hospital with-
out arresting him. 
This change is, undoubtedly, the legislature's response to case 
law holding that blood alcohol tests taken from unarrested suspects 
should be suppressed. For example, in State v. Brunei** and State 
v. Gordon,29 suspects were taken to a hospital for treatment of inju-
ries, and were given blood alcohol tests prior to arrest. In both 
cases, the Kansas Supreme Court suppressed the results of the tests 
on the ground that the tests were searches neither authorized by the 
implied consent statute nor consented to by the suspects, and were 
therefore illegal. 
The legislature's grant of statutory authority for the police to act 
in the absence of arrest raises a serious constitutional question: does 
the fourth amendment permit the police to take a blood test upon 
probable cause to arrest or search, when they neither have a war-
rant nor intend to arrest? Various state courts have disagreed on 
this issue.30 To the extent Kansas courts have spoken, their lan-
guage would appear to cast doubt on the new statute's 
constitutionality.81 
The constitutional basis for permitting blood tests without a war-
rant is generally recognized as an outgrowth of the authority of po-
lice to search incident to arrest. If police have probable cause to 
believe a person has committed a crime, they may arrest. Incident 
to that arrest, they may, without a warrant or probable cause, 
search the person and the area in his immediate control.32 
In Schmerber v. California,33 the United States Supreme Court 
held that under certain circumstances, police may forcibly extract a 
blood sample from a defendant incident to an arrest for driving 
under the influence. The defendant argued that the warrantless 
search into the body could not be justified as a search incident to 
arrest. The Court recognized that a bodily intrusion, such as a 
blood test, represented a far greater affront to "human dignity" and 
privacy than the traditional search incident to arrest of a person for 
weapons and evidence. Therefore, the Court concluded that a bodily 
intrusion incident to arrest could not take place "on the mere 
chance that the desired evidence might be obtained"; rather, the 
state must show a "clear indication" that the evidence will be found 
by the test.34 In Schmerber, the evidence of intoxication that estab-
lished probable cause to arrest also suggested the relevance and 
" K.S.A. § 8-1001 (b) (Supp. 1985). 
" 211 Kan. 596, 507 P.2d 233 (1973). 
" 219 Kan. 643, 549 P.2d 886 (1976). 
80 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969). 
88 3 84 U.S. 757 (1966). 
84 Id. at 770. 
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success of the blood test. 
The Court then considered whether such tests could be conducted 
without a warrant. The Court recognized that the percentage of al-
cohol in the blood diminishes after drinking stops. Noting that the 
officer might therefore have concluded that he was confronted with 
an emergency that required the test to be taken before a warrant 
could be obtained, the Court found the test to be "an appropriate 
incident to petitioner's arrest."35 
Schmerber serves as the authority for requiring warrantless and 
forcible blood alcohol tests for suspects properly arrested for drunk 
driving offenses. It also provides the justification for those states, 
like Kansas, that require a license forfeiture, rather than forcible 
testing, if a suspect refuses to submit to a test.86 
A number of courts have limited Schmerber to its facts and have 
held that police may not compel a blood test absent a reasonably 
contemporaneous arrest.87 For example, in People v. Superior 
Court,38 a case decided shortly after Schmerber, the California Su-
preme Court upheld the trial court's suppression of evidence of a 
hospital blood sample taken from an unarrested defendant. The 
California court rejected the view that an arrest was a mere formal-
ity.89 The court concluded that Schmerber's approval of the com-
pulsory seizure of blood was clearly grounded on the premise that it 
is incident to a lawful arrest. This same conclusion has been 
reached in numerous other states,40 and was reaffirmed only re-
cently by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Harvey.f1 In Har-
vey, a blood sample was taken from a hospitalized but unarrested 
suspect over her objection. The Ninth Circuit reversed the convic-
tion, stating it was "constrained" by Schmerber in requiring that a 
valid formal arrest be made before taking a blood sample.42 
To the extent Kansas cases have spoken on this issue, they have 
also noted the need for a valid arrest as a condition precedent to a 
blood test. In State v. Bruner,48 the Kansas Supreme Court stated 
that "insofar as the constitution goes, a blood sample could have 
been taken from the defendant . . . even in the absence of con-
sent—if he had been arrested."" In State v. Williams,46 the Kan-
sas Court of Appeals found that the then-existing implied consent 
law, requiring an arrest precedent to a blood test, stated the consti-
tutional minimum. The court, in a footnote, stated that "the consti-
36 Id. at 771. 
36 See, e.g., State v. Bruner, 211 Kan. 596, 604, 507 P.2d 233, 237-38 (1973). 
17 See generally 2 W . LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.4, at 341-45 (1978). 
48 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972). 
» Id. at 761, 493 P.2d at 447, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 283. 
40 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 266 A.2d 873 (1967); Commonwealth v. 
Hlavsa, 266 Pa. Super. 602, 405 A.2d 1270 (1979). 
41 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983). 
48 Id. at 803-04. 
48 211 Kan. 596, 507 P.2d 233 (1973). 
44 211 Kan. at 603, 507 P.2d at 239 (emphasis in original). 
45 4 Kan. App. 2d 651, 610 P.2d 111 (1980). 
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tution . . . requires a lawful arrest, absent a valid search warrant 
or voluntary consent, to justify the taking of a blood sample as an 
incident thereto."46 
There is, on the other hand, support for the view that police have 
the authority to take a blood test upon probable cause, even if they 
do not make a formal arrest. While the United States Supreme 
Court has not addressed this exact issue, Cupp v. Murphy47 seem-
ingly favors the constitutionality of the new law. In Cupp, police 
took samples of fingernail scrapings from an unarrested homicide 
suspect. The samples contained traces of skin and blood cells which 
linked the suspect to the homicide. Although the police possessed 
probable cause to arrest, the suspect was released after the search 
and not formally arrested until a month later. In upholding the 
search the Court indicated that in the absence of a formal arrest, a 
full search incident to arrest might not be justified. Nevertheless, in 
the case the Court approved the "very limited search" necessary to 
preserve the "highly evanescent evidence" found under the suspect's 
fingernails.48 
Cupp can be read as supporting the general proposition that 
when police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, they may 
search for evidence reasonably believed to be in the suspect's pos-
session that might later be unavailable, even if they make no formal 
contemporaneous arrest.49 Application of this principle to laws such 
as the new implied consent provision supports their constitutional-
ity. The police have no authority to search unless they have proba-
ble cause to arrest. Moreover, in the blood test situation, the evi-
dence of alcohol concentration will disappear unless the police are 
permitted to test. In fact, in reliance on Cupp, a majority of recent 
courts considering the issue have held that blood tests should be 
permitted upon probable cause, even if no arrest occurs.60 
The better reasoned cases sustain the legality of the searches. 
The need for an immediate search is not affected in any degree by 
whether the police formally arrest. Because the percentage of alco-
hol in the body begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, the 
police must act quickly or the evidence will dissipate. The police, 
therefore, face an emergency that is unaffected by whether the de-
fendant is formally arrested. More significantly, the requirement of 
a formal arrest does not aid the defendant or protect his privacy. In 
fact, the arrest requirement forces the police officer, at the outset, 
to take an extremely intrusive step against the liberty of the sus-
pect. Arrest eliminates the possibility of proceeding by summons or 
49 4 Kan. App. 2d at 654 n.2, 610 P.2d at 114 n.2 (citing State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 
566, 608 P.2d 1321 (1980)). 
47 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
48 Id. at 296. 
48 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.4, at 341-44 (1978). 
50 See, e.g., People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1984); State v. Libby, 453 A.2d 
481 (Me. 1982); State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1980); Van Order v. State, 600 
P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1979). 
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other means to bring the suspect into court. 
Policy arguments in support of an arrest requirement are uncon-
vincing. In United States v. Harvey, the court stated that an arrest 
requirement would 
help insure that the police do not arbitrarily violate an individual's 
privacy. Also, it will sharply delineate the moment at which the police 
officer determined he or she had probable cause to arrest . . . . Fur-
thermore, the formal announcement of arrest triggers certain respon-
sibilities for the arresting officer and gives rise to certain rights to the 
accused; for example, those rights delineated in a proper Miranda 
warning.61 
A mandatory arrest will not insure against arbitrary police viola-
tion of individual privacy. With or without arrest, police may not 
demand a test unless they have probable cause. The request for a 
test will delineate the moment an officer believes he has probable 
cause just as distinctly as an invocation of a formal arrest. The fact 
that the police must, under the statute, inform the suspect of the 
consequences of refusing a test eliminates the argument that advan-
tages or "rights" are somehow lost if the suspect is not arrested. In 
short, both the state and suspect should benefit by an implied con-
sent statute triggered by probable cause rather than probable cause 
plus arrest. Nothing is gained by requiring a policeman who has 
probable cause to believe that a hospitalized suspect was driving 
while intoxicated to chant some order of arrest before requesting a 
blood sample. 
2. Testing of Other Bodily Substances for Drugs 
A second major change in the statute is the expansion of the test-
able substances and the means of testing permitted by police. Prior 
to the 1985 amendment, the police were authorized to demand con-
sent only for tests of "breath or blood" to determine alcohol con-
tent.52 The new law, in addition to these tests, permits tests of 
"urine or other bodily substance" for alcohol or "drugs."53 The leg-
islature included these additions following testimony at hearings in-
dicating that numerous drugs other than alcohol can impair driving 
ability and consideration of studies showing that as many as one-
half of the suspects arrested in certain states for driving while im-
paired had consumed sedative or hypnotic drugs.54 The law contem-
plates that police officers will first attempt to measure intoxication 
by requesting a breath or blood test. If, however, an officer has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that an impairment is caused by a drug 
not detectable by a breath or blood test, a urine test may be re-
quested. The test must be supervised by persons of the same sex as 
61 701 F.2d at 805 (9th Cir. 1983). 
82 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (a) (1982) (repealed 1985). 
68 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (a) (Supp. 1985). 
54 Hearings Before House Committee on Federal and State Affairs, Feb. 26,1985 (tes-
timony of Dr. Tim Rohrig, Kansas Bureau of Investigation). 
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the person being tested.56 Presumably, tests of other bodily fluids, 
such as saliva, are also permitted. No warrant is required for collec-
tion of the sample. 
The new section may present a constitutional issue. Under 
Schmerber, blood tests and other intrusions into the body are per-
missible without a warrant because the state can show a need for an 
immediate search—unless the police move quickly the percentage 
of alcohol in the suspect's blood will diminish.66 If a urine sample is 
regarded as an intrusion into the body similar to a blood test, the 
state will need to show a similar justification for proceeding without 
a warrant. 
A threshhold question is whether the collection of a urine sample 
should be regarded as an intrusion into the body, or whether, like 
fingerprinting, it is a "routine" search that generally can be con-
ducted incident to an arrest. At present, the authorities are not con-
sistent on this question. In People v. Williams67 the Colorado Su-
preme Court concluded that a lawful custodial arrest does not alone 
justify the taking of a urine sample. The court found no difference 
in the degree of bodily intrusion surrounding a blood test and the 
compelled production of bodily fluids required in urinalysis. A con-
trary view is held by Professor LaFave, who believes urinalysis does 
not involve a bodily intrusion requiring any special requirement be-
yond a lawful arrest.68 
The Kansas courts have not directly addressed the question. In a 
recent case, however, the Kansas Court of Appeals required that 
police obtain a warrant before taking evidence from the defendant's 
body. In State v. Gammill,69 a sheriff plucked some 20-25 pubic 
hairs from an incarcerated defendant. In striking down the search, 
the court found the search a "needless indignity" and concluded: 
Neither can it be claimed that the warrantless search was necessary 
because of exigent circumstances. Pubic hairs may be expected to re-
main where they are for a considerable period of time—certainly long 
enough to obtain a valid warrant or court order.60 
If a urine specimen is subject to the same rules as a blood test, a 
warrantless search will be constitutional only if urine specimens, 
like tests for alcohol, must be taken quickly before the suspected 
presence of the drug diminishes. The answer to that question is by 
no means as certain in urinalysis tests for drugs as it is for alcohol. 
Some drugs, marijuana for example, will remain in the body for 
days or longer.61 Thus, an officer who believes a driver has used 
66 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (d) (Supp. 1985). 
56 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-61 (1966). 
87 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d 399 (1976). 
6 8 2 W . LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5 . 3 , a t 3 2 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
59 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978). 
60 Id. at 628, 585 P.2d at 1077. 
61 See, e.g., McBay, Dubowski & Finkle, Urine Testing for Marijuana Use, 249 
J.A.M.A. 881 (Feb. 18, 1983) (letter to the editor). 
10 KANSAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R E V I E W [Vol. 3 
marijuana would arguably have little justification for proceeding 
before a warrant can be obtained. On the other hand, if an officer 
believes other drugs are involved, the justification may exist for im-
mediately requiring a urine specimen to accurately ascertain the 
presence of those drugs. In any event, where the officer is uncertain 
of the intoxicating drug that the suspect has consumed, it would 
seem unrealistic to require the officer to first obtain a warrant 
before obtaining a urine specimen. 
Beyond any constitutional questions, the testing of urine speci-
mens raises serious practical difficulties which will be encountered 
when law enforcement officials attempt to determine the quantity 
and duration of a drug's presence in a suspect's urine. The new 
statute provides for "all qualitative and quantitative tests for alco-
hol and drugs."62 While there are well-accepted and easily adminis-
tered tests to determine the quantity of alcohol in the blood, similar 
tests to measure the quantity of drugs in urine are less well-estab-
lished. Commonly used tests such as thin-layer chromatography 
merely determine whether a particular drug is present in the 
urine.63 Similar problems surround tests to determine how long a 
drug has been in a suspect's body. Unlike alcohol, which is quickly 
metabolized, certain drugs, such as marijuana, will remain in the 
body for a prolonged period. Complex testing procedures requiring 
analysis of multiple specimens taken at different times are needed 
to determine the duration of a drug's presence in a suspect's system. 
At the present time it is questionable whether most police officers 
have the necessary training to conduct such tests. 
Since the use of purely qualitative urinalysis testing will simply 
reveal whether a particular drug has been used at an undetermined 
time, serious evidentiary questions surround the use of such test re-
sults in a DUI prosecution. In prosecutions involving the use of ma-
rijuana, which may remain in a suspect's system for a prolonged 
period,64 the prejudicial effect of such evidence arguably outweighs 
its probative value.65 Yet even for drugs which metabolize rapidly 
after consumption, purely qualitative evidence, standing alone, will 
be of limited evidentiary value. 
Even when the presence of a drug in a person's system can be 
62 K.S.A. § 8-1001 (a) (Supp. 1985). 
63 Unless otherwise noted, all medical information discussed in this Article was ob-
tained through telephone conversations on February 5, 1986, with Dr. Aryeh Hurwitz, 
Professor of Clinical Pharmacology at the University of Kansas Medical Center; Morris 
Fairman, Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at the University of Kansas; and 
Joyce Generali, Association Professor of Pharmacy Practice and Administrative Director 
of the Drug and Poison Information Center at the University of Kansas Medical Center. 
64 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. An additional problem may exist in the 
use of purely qualitative tests for the detection of marijuana and hashish in light of recent 
studies revealing that cannabinoids may be detected in individuals who have been only 
passively exposed to such substances. See Morland, Bugge, Skuterud, Steen, Wethe & 
Kjeldsen, Cannabinoids in Blood and Urine after Passive Inhalation of Cannabis Smoke, 
3 0 J. FORENSIC SCI . 9 9 7 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
68 See K.S.A. 60-445; State v. Davis, 213 Kan. 54, 515 P.2d 802 (1973). 
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quantitatively measured, the legislature has failed to set forth any 
standards for determining what quantity of a particular drug is 
deemed to render a person incapable of driving safely.66 This failure 
is likely due to the fact that there currently are no medically ac-
cepted standards for such a determination. Even if quantitative 
standards existed, a quantitative measurement of the presence of a 
drug may have little correlation to the degree of driving impair-
ment. This is particularly true when therapeutic drugs are in-
volved.67 Many prescription and over-the-counter drugs, including 
frequently used products such as antihistamines, have sedative side 
effects. When such medication is used for a prolonged period, toler-
ance develops. Consequently, a high concentration of such a drug in 
a person's system may have little effect on that person's ability to 
drive safely.68 Because there are no currently accepted standards 
for determining impairment caused by drugs other than alcohol, it 
may not be feasible for the legislature to delineate specific stan-
dards for determining when a driver is deemed incapable of driving 
safely. Yet without such standards, even quantitative evidence of 
the presence of a drug may be inadequate to establish persuasive 
evidence of impairment. 
3. Warning the DUI Suspect 
The 1985 amendments to the drunk driving laws require police 
officers to give a series of warnings prior to requesting a driver to 
submit to chemical tests. Officers must provide both oral and writ-
ten notice that: 
(A) There is no right to consult with an attorney regarding whether to 
submit to testing; (B) refusal to submit to testing will result in six 
months' suspension of the person's driver's license; (C) refusal to sub-
mit to testing may be used against the person at any trial on a charge 
involving driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or 
both; (D) the results of the testing may be used against the person at 
any trial on a charge involving driving while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, or both; and (E) after the completion of the testing, 
the person has the right to consult with an attorney and may secure 
additional testing, which, if desired, should be done as soon as possible 
and is customarily available from hospitals, medical laboratories and 
physicians.89 
68 K.S.A. § 8-1005(a)(3) (Supp. 1985) simply provides that: 
[i]f there was present in the defendant's bodily substance any narcotic, hyp-
notic, somnifacient, stimulating or other drug which has the capacity to render 
the defendant incapable of safety driving a vehicle, that fact may be considered 
to determine if the defendant was under the influence of drugs, or both alcohol 
and drugs, to a degree that renders the defendant incapable of driving safely. 
67 Id. § 8-1567(c). 
®8 Under K.S.A. § 8-1567(b) (Supp. 1985), it is unlawful for any person who is a habit-
ual user of any narcotic, hypnotic, somnifacient or stimulating drug to operate or attempt 
to operate a motor vehicle. Under subsection (c) of that statute, it is not a defense that the 
person is legally entitled to use the drug. Thus, it is seemingly illegal for an individual 
regularly using prescription medication with similar side effects to operate a motor vehicle. 
60 K.S.A. § 8-1001(0(1)-
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Although these warnings should help some suspects better under-
stand their rights, they become yet another obligation for an inves-
tigating officer and may create a new defense to DUI charges. 
The new statutory warnings are, in essence, a codification of the 
Kansas Supreme Court's holding in Standish v. Department of 
Revenue.70 In Standish, the court held that a DUI suspect has no 
fifth amendment right to consult with an attorney before deciding 
whether to submit to a blood alcohol test.71 The fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused from being 
compelled to reveal testimonial or communicative evidence to the 
police. To protect that privilege a suspect must, upon request, be 
provided an attorney before being subjected to station house ques-
tioning. Blood and breath tests, being neither testimonial nor com-
municative, are not covered by the fifth amendment privilege.72 Be-
cause there is no constitutional privilege to refuse a blood test, the 
court held that a driver has no right to consult with counsel in de-
termining whether to submit to a test.73 
While deciding against a right to consult with counsel, the 
Standish court recognized a problem faced by the arrested suspect. 
The DUI suspect had been informed of his Miranda rights at the 
time of the arrest. Under Miranda,74 a suspect is told that he has a 
right to consult with an attorney before being subjected to custodial 
questioning by the police.75 The Standish court found the DUI sus-
70 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984). 
71 235 Kan. at 904, 683 P.2d at 1281. 
74 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). 
78 235 Kan. at 904, 683 P.2d at 1281. The following year, in State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 
313, 691 P.2d 1 (1984), the court addressed the right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment, which provides the accused with the right to counsel for all critical stages of the 
prosecution. The court found that the decision to submit to testing is not a critical stage of 
the "prosecution" for sixth amendment purposes because it is made before the filing of a 
complaint, when, in Kansas, adversary judicial proceedings are initiated and the right to 
counsel attaches. The court also found the decision to submit to a Blood Alcohol Test 
(BAT) is not a "critical stage" because the driver has already impliedly consented to 
testing and has no constitutional right to refuse testing. 
74 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
75 Id. at 471. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings must be given prior to any custodial interro-
gation of a suspect arrested for a misdemeanor offense, such as driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs, as well as for felony offenses. An interesting question arises in light of 
the provision in the amendment to the Kansas drunk driving laws which permits testing of 
a suspect who is not formally arrested but has been involved in an accident involving 
property damage, personal injury or death. While the new statutory notice clearly must be 
given to such a person, it is less clear whether the Miranda warnings likewise must be 
given before the person is subjected to police interrogation. It would seem that when blood 
or urine tests are required, Miranda must be given. K.S.A. § 8-1001(c) (Supp. 1985) 
provides that blood tests may be administered only by qualified medical personnel. Under 
K.S.A. § 8-1001(d), privacy requirements attach to the administration of urinalysis exam-
inations. Thus, such tests must necessarily be administered at a location away from the 
scene of the accident. Transporting a suspect to the testing location constitutes such a 
significant curtailment of the suspect's freedom of action that the suspect is in custody, 
even if not formally under arrest. While the mere administration of the test would not 
invoke Miranda because there is no interrogation, any question accompanying the testing, 
such as questions calculated to determine the nature or quantity of the alcohol or drugs 
consumed by the suspect, would bring Miranda into play. On the other hand, the adminis-
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pect's refusal to submit to testing understandable in light of the 
confusion caused by giving Miranda without specifying the inappli-
cability of the right to counsel in determining whether to take a 
blood alcohol test.76 To alleviate such confusion, the court stated 
that when giving Miranda warnings an officer "should also tell" an 
arrested suspect of the implied consent law and that there is no 
right to consult with counsel before deciding to take a test.77 The 
court added that the officer "could well add" that the suspect's re-
fusal to take the test may be used as evidence against the suspect in 
a subsequent DUI prosecution and will probably result in a suspen-
sion of his driving privileges.78 Although the conditional nature of 
the language used in Standish did not clearly establish that the lat-
ter two warnings are mandatory, a year later in State v. Bristor,™ 
the court construed Standish as affirmatively requiring that a per-
son arrested for DUI be informed of the consequences of a refusal 
to submit to testing.80 
Any remaining ambiguity about the mandatory nature of such 
warnings is removed by the statutory notice requirements contained 
in the 1985 amendments. Although the statute provides that the 
question of whether the statutory notice was given is one of only 
four issues that may be raised at an administrative license suspen-
sion hearing,81 it is silent as to the consequences of a police officer's 
failure to give the warnings in a DUI prosecution. Such failure, 
however, will apparently render test results inadmissible in a DUI 
prosecution. This conclusion is largely premised on the mandatory 
language of the statute, which expressly provides that the notice 
"shall be given."82 Inadmissibility of unwarned test results is the 
only practical way to insure that the warnings are actually given. A 
contrary result would make the new requirements virtually mean-
ingless, for no purpose is served by requiring the notice if test re-
sults are admissible even if the warnings are not given.83 
The new law provides that failure to understand the warnings 
because of intoxication or injury resulting from such intoxication 
does not constitute a defense in a DUI prosecution.84 Nevertheless, 
tration of a breath test at the scene of the accident would not require Miranda warnings 
before similar questioning can be conducted. Such questioning would fall far short of cus-
todial interrogation, but would rather constitute mere roadside questioning, which does not 
require Miranda warnings. See Berkemer, 104 S. Ct. at 3144. 
76 235 Kan. at 905, 683 P.2d at 1281-82. 
77 Id. at 904-05, 683 P.2d at 1281-82. 
78 Id. at 905, 683 P.2d at 1281. 
70 236 Kan. 313, 691 P.2d 1 (1984). 
80 2 36 Kan. at 319, 691 P.2d at 6. 
81 K.S.A. § 8-1002(d) (Supp. 1985). 
82 Id. § 8-1001(0(1). 
83 The statutory amendments also provide that "[n]othing in this section shall be con-
strued to limit the admissibility at any trial of alcohol ,pr drug concentration testing results 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant." K.S.A. § 8-1001(g) (Supp. 1985). Thus, failure 
to give the statutory notice will not render test results inadmissible if the test was con-
ducted with a warrant. 
M K.S.A. § 8-1001(0(2) (Supp. 1985). 
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a suspect must be given both oral and written notice even if uncon-
scious or intoxicated to the extent of being incapable of understand-
ing the warnings.86 A suspect's inability to comprehend the notice 
has no constitutional implications since, under Schmerber, a DUI 
suspect has no constitutional right to refuse a blood alcohol test.86 
Providing the statutory notice to a suspect who is incapable of un-
derstanding may be a hollow formality, but it is a requirement 
which nevertheless must be followed. The requirement that the no-
tice be in writing will establish that it was in fact given to a suspect 
who was so intoxicated he cannot remember receiving the oral 
recitation. 
The new statutory notice requirement includes one provision 
which was not mentioned in Standish and which the Kansas Court 
of Appeals had previously held not to be required87 The officer 
must now inform a suspect of the right to secure additional testing 
from an independent source.88 This information is particularly im-
portant in light of the 1985 amendment to K.S.A. § 8-1006, which 
provides that test samples need not be preserved and furnished to a 
suspect for independent testing. Without the added warning, a sus-
pect may be unaware of his rights, and thus lose any opportunity to 
independently challenge the result of the state's tests. 
In summary, the new notice requirement imposes a more exten-
sive obligation upon an investigating officer than previously required 
by the Kansas courts. Failure to give the notice, even to a suspect 
incapable of understanding it, should preclude the admissibility of 
the results of a test administered to the suspect. Despite the new 
obligations imposed upon law enforcement officers, the notice re-
quirement serves the salutary purpose of clarifying any ambiguity 
concerning the right to counsel which may result from the Miranda 
warnings and provides a DUI suspect with the information neces-
sary to make an informed decision whether to submit to testing. 
4. Preserving the Evidence of the Test 
Finally, the new drunk driving law explicitly states that samples 
of blood, breath or urine need not be preserved or furnished to the 
suspect for independent testing.89 While preserving such samples 
for a defendant is probably neither technically infeasible nor unduly 
burdensome for law enforcement officers, the constitutionality of 
this provision, at least as to breath samples, finds support in a re-
85 In State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566, 608 P.2d 1321 (1980), the court held that the 
implied consent law applies even to an unconscious defendant who is incapable of making 
a knowing and intelligent response to a request for testing. Regardless of his condition, it 
is incumbent upon the suspect to make an express refusal. 
86 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 (1966). The Court concluded the 
suspect's fifth and sixth amendment rights had not been violated despite the suspect's 
adamant refusal, on counsel's advice, to submit to a blood test. 
87 City of Shawnee v. Gruss, 2 Kan. App. 2d 131, 576 P.2d 239 (1978), petition for 
rev. denied, 225 Kan. 843 (1978). 
88 K.S.A. § 8-1001(f)(l)(E) (Supp. 1985). 
89 Id. § 8-1006. 
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cent decision of the United States Supreme Court. In California v. 
Trombetta,90 the Court reversed a lower court's ruling that due pro-
cess requires law enforcement officials to preserve breath samples 
tested by a breath testing device for the use of the defendant.91 The 
Court noted that it was the test results, not the actual breath sam-
ple, that is presented as evidence.92 The significant questions sur-
rounding such evidence are the accuracy of the testing device, 
which can be determined without preservation of the defendant's 
breath sample, and the propriety of the administration of the test, 
which can be challenged through cross-examination of the operator 
of the testing device.93 
While Trombetta only addressed the absence of a requirement 
that breath samples be preserved, its rationale supports the conclu-
sion that samples of blood, urine and other bodily fluids likewise 
need not be preserved. The Court in Trombetta noted that it would 
be technically feasible to preserve breath samples but nevertheless 
found that due process did not mandate such preservation.94 Such 
reasoning would be applicable to any bodily substance which can be 
extracted and tested. Further, as with breath testing devices, de-
fendants will be able to inquire into the accuracy of the type of 
testing system and the quality of the test administration. 
Finally, the absence of a preservation requirement will not be 
prejudicial to a DUI suspect in light of the new requirement that an 
officer must notify a suspect of his right to obtain independent test-
ing.95 Such testing will enable a DUI suspect to gauge the accuracy 
of the test administered by the state. While under Trombetta notifi-
cation of the right to obtain independent testing is not a constitu-
tional prerequisite to the validity of the provision that samples not 
be preserved,96 such notification adds weight to the fairness of that 
provision. 
Conclusion 
While the new Kansas drunk driving laws increase the ability of 
80 California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984). 
81 People v. Trombetta, 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983). 
92 California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. at 2533. 
93 Id. at 2534. Prior to the decision in Trombetta, the Kansas Supreme Court had 
reached the same result, though on substantially different grounds, in State v. Young, 228 
Kan. 355, 614 P.2d 441 (1980). 
84 California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. at 2535. The Kansas court, conversely, relied 
upon evidence that breath samples are expanded in the testing process and are thus not 
readily preservable as a factor in its decision that failure to preserve such samples does not 
violate due process. Young, 228 Kan. at 361, 614 P.2d at 445-46. 
96 K.S.A. § 8-1004 (Supp. 1985). A DUI suspect also has the right to have a report of 
the testing results made available to him. Id. § 8-1001(h). 
86 Cf. California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. at 2535 n.l l (no due process violation in 
failure to preserve breath samples in spite of no showing defendants were aware of right to 
independent testing under California law). 
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the police to gather information on both alcohol and drug intoxica-
tion, they also create significant constitutional and practical issues. 
The Kansas Supreme Court will surely be required to resolve 
whether the constitution permits the taking of a blood test upon 
probable cause when the police have declined to arrest the suspect. 
Similarly, the court will need to explore the consequences of a fail-
ure by the police to adequately warn suspects about the blood test. 
The expansion of testing from those measuring alcohol content to 
those determining the presence of drugs will require prosecutors 
and defense attorneys alike to examine unfamiliar scientific testing 
procedures. As the problem of driving while intoxicated has in-
creased, so too has the range of legal issues confronting the criminal 
practitioner. 
